"The that concluded the Second World War and formulated the Allied post-war strategy also came under heavy criticism for its inadequacy and short-sightedness. Like several other students of politics and war, General Fueller was also its vehement critic. His contention was that the Allied leaders had sacrificed the vital necessity of obtaining a durable peace at the altar of securing the unconditional surrender of Germany. The great military thinker had, however, no alternative of his own to suggest to them. As the Second World War came to a close, the Allied war effort also began to give way to their respective national interests. Each side, however, had its own interpretation of what constituted its interpretation of what constituted its enlightened national interests. Russia saw her interests in conquering the heart of Europe, the Allies, in the destruction of the German military might. The consideration of peace did weigh heavy on the minds of the nations of Europe whenever they developed the means to destroy one-another. Such an atmosphere prevailed after the conclusion of each devastating war and after the atomic explosion of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But, it did not last long. The Europeans soon came to realise that there did exist means of protection against weapons that were once looked upon as total and absolute. Once that happened, their baser and destructive elements again overtook the saner ones. Similar motives underline the present age of 'detente' and 'deterrence'. The considerations of peace come to human mind only when the choice is between 'suicide' and 'co-existence'. They are the by-products of exigency, not of a recognised or consistent policy or philosophy. They failed to stand the test of time in the past, nor are they resulting in durable global peace at present. Indeed, they have no worth while role to play in the future."

“In his penetrating war, 'Strategy: The Indirect Approach,' Liddell Hart Made an attempt to epitomize, from the history of war, a few truths of experience which seemed to him so universal and fundamental as to be termed 'axioms.' According to him, the maxims applied to tactics as well as strategy alike. The great military think came to the general conclusion that all the principles of war could be concentrated into one single principle, that is, concentration of strength against weakness. To apply this principle, he put forward eight rules, six positive and two negative. The positive rules were: the maintenance of the aim; the adjustment of the means to the end; the adoption of the line of least expectation and resistance; the undertaking of a line of operation that threatened multiple objectives; and ensuring that plans and dispositions were flexible and adaptable to the circumstances. In the negative rules, he advocated that all the weight should not be thrown in one stroke while the enemy was on guard, and that an attack, once failed, should not be resumed along the same lines or in the same form.”

“National interest," concedes Bernard Brodie, "are not fixed by nature nor are identifiable by any generally acceptable standard of objective criteria. They are, instead, the product of fallible human judgement on matters on which agreement within the nation is unusually less than universal." Nor is the formulation of national interests, as is well-know to us today, necessarily or essentially governed by the consideration of peace. That being so, the logical outcome of the concept of national interests in the international system of today is tension and war, and not peace, harmony, justice and understanding. Indeed, national interest is: in train a vicious and never.ending cycle, the common denominator of which is 'war', not 'peace'.”

“hen God wishes to impose His will upon the His enemies, He chooses to do so by casting terror into their hearts….“Let not the Unbelievers think,” God commands us directly and pointedly, “that they can get better : they will never frustrate them. Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know.’ .”

““Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end itself,” Malik states, “It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision on the enemy; it is the decision we wish to impose on him.”

“The Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the heart of the enemies, know or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being terror-stricken by the enemy. In this strategy, guarding ourselves against terror is the 'Base'; preparation for war to the utmost the 'Cause'; while the striking terror into the hearts of the enemies is the 'Effect'. The whole philosophy revolves round the human heart, his soul, spirit and Faith. In war, our main objective is the opponent's heart or soul, our main weapon of offence against this objective is the strength of our own souls, and to launch such attack, we have to keep terror away from our own hearts. The Quranic strategy comes into play from the preparation stage, and aims at imposing a direct decision upon the enemy. Other things remaining the same, our preparation for war is the true index of our performance during war. We must aim at creating a wholesome respect for our Cause an our will and determination to attain it, in the minds of the enemies, well before facing them on the field of battle. So spirited, zealous, complete and thorough should be our preparation for war that we should enter upon the 'war of muscles' having already won the 'war of will'. Only a strategy that aims at striking terror into the hearts of the enemies from the preparation stage can produce direct results and turn Liddell Hart's dream into a reality.”

“In an article pertaining to the evolution of strategic thought, Harry L. Coles expresses the view that the history of strategy can be divided into two-time groups: the pre-1945 time-group during which strategy suffered from under think; and the post-1945 period in which it has been suffering from the opposite malady—the over-think. The climax of the pre-1945 strategic thought was the discovery that the decision should be sought in the psychological dimensions of war. With the advent of the nuclear bomb in the post-1945 period, the theory of strategy has, after passing through several evolutionary stages eventually come to be dominated by 'deterrence'.”