"In consequence, the civil services of many Third World nations operate as feudal baronies, exploiting those with whom they deal. In the absence of institutions or organized groups capable of restraining official venality, the employees and officials of these bureaucracies possess virtually untrammeled power for obtaining personal wealth."

“During 1968, more than forty-four hundred companies disappeared by mergers involving an estimated $43 billion in securities—an all-time record. In this tidal wave of mergers, which subsequently crested and receded, conglomerate firms accounted for either a substantial or a preponderant fraction, depending upon the definition of ‘conglomerate’ adopted.”

“During the decade of the 1970s, the print and electronic media emerged as an institution comparable in power and influence to the three coordinate branches of government. Shielded by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the press has become almost invulnerable to the criticism and legislative curbs that limit the power of such other social institutions as business or government. Congressmen, who depend upon the radio and television networks for national visibility, are loath to level criticisms at the media.”

“In many foreign nations, especially those in the Third World, political and social evolution has been such as to produce a monolithic state that lacks any clear division between a public and a private sector. Indeed, throughout much of the world today, official political ideology is hostile to the concepts of the private-enterprise market economy.”

“The postwar burgeoning of oil enterprises throughout the world wrought important changes in the structure of the foreign oil industry. Competitors multiplied, concentration of the industry was reduced, and the market positions of the ‘seven largest’ companies shrank.”

“The revelation that American companies were making payments to foreign political parties and government officials touched a sensitive nerve in the post-Watergate era. Although most knowledgeable people were aware of the bribery of domestic government officials, they felt more keenly about the payment of millions of dollars to foreign officials.”

“The competition of government oil companies with private enterprises was often buttressed by monopoly privileges, public preferences, low-priced capital, special tax benefits, or freedom from the commercial obligation to earn a normal return on investment. These government companies, regardless of whether they had complete or partial monopolies of oil production and trade in their own countries, were part of the structure of the foreign oil industry. They could not be dismissed as ‘noncompetitive’ with private oil enterprises.”